Santa Monica College Summary of Philosophy of Language and Meta Ethics Essay
It’s an 8 page article on the philosophy of language that needs to be summarized.
Read and analyze that article (not just the abstract): Identify the principal stages of the author’s presentation. There are likely to be two major phases in the article that will need examination and explanation:
250 to 300 words: A philosophical issue or problem will be stated which warrants treatment.Explain that issue and why the issue needs treatment (the author’s reason)
For example, the author(s) might identify
(a) an established thesis of an earlier writer or school of thought with which the author disagrees
(b) an inadequacy in a concept or theory which is shown to be in need of a new
(c) a debate, a confusion, a vagary of some theory or idea already prominent in the field that the authorbelieves is in need of examination and/or clarification
250 to 300 words about the author’s resolution, concluding argument, solution, or theoretical recommendation
Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics
Author(s): Ira M. Schnall
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) , Oct., 2004, Vol. 54, No. 217 (Oct., 2004), pp.
587-594
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association
and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3542746
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The Philosophical QJarter~y, Vol. 54, No. 217 October 2004
ISSN oo31-8o94
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND META-ETHICS
By IRAI M. SCHNALL
Meta-ethical discussions commonly distinguish ‘subjectivism’ from ’emotivism’, or
But Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have argued that plausible assumptions in the
language entail that expressivism collapses into subjectivism. Though there have be
their argument, I think the responses have not adequately diagnosed the real weakness
my own diagnosis, and defend expressivism as a viable theory distinct from subjectivism
I. INTRODUCTION
In meta-ethics, it is common to distinguish two related theories, on
‘subjectivism’, the other either ’emotivism’ or ‘expressivism’. Subjec
that an ethical sentence of the form
i. x is good
means the same as a sentence reporting the speaker’s attitude, in th
form
2. I approve of x.
According to subjectivism, (I), like (2), is true if the speaker approves of x, and is false
if the speaker does not approve of x. Expressivism, on the other hand, is the
view that an ethical sentence expresses, but does not report, the speaker’s attitude,
and therefore that (i) is equivalent not to (2), but rather to something like the
exclamation
3. Hooray for x!
or perhaps the prescription
4. Please, everyone, do what you can to promote x.
Expressivists generally claim that (I), like (3) and (4), has no truth-conditions. That
they claim that unlike reports of one’s attitudes, ethical sentences express on
attitudes in such a way that those sentences are neither true nor false. The differe
between these two views is thought to be important; subjectivism is supposed to
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588 IRA M. SCHNALL
open to serious objections which do not affect expressi
Philip Pettit (henceforth J&P) have argued that certain
philosophy of language entail that expressivism is unte
expressivism collapses into subjectivism.2
Relying on a claim in the philosophy of language whic
J&P argue that since expressivists maintain that an e
speaker’s attitude, they must admit that an ethical sen
i.e., it is true if and only if the speaker really has th
otherwise false. So (i) is, after all, equivalent to (2), at
conditions. The argument is as follows.
According to the Lockean philosophy of language, a
from a convention, or agreement, to use s when we bel
ditions c obtains and we think that circumstances a
communicating the content of, that belief. Thus, for ex
5. x is square
has the meaning it has because
5a. We have agreed to use (5) when we believe that x is square and that
circumstances are right for communicating this fact (i.e., for expressing, or
communicating the content of, our belief that x is square).
Applying this philosophy of language to the expressivist view that we use (i) to
express our approval of x, we get:
a. We have agreed to use (I) when we believe that we approve of x and think that
the circumstances are right for expressing that belief.
I take (a) to be equivalent to what J&P express as ‘(B2) belief claim (good): we have
agreed to use “x is good” when we believe that we approve of x and that conditions
are right for communicating this fact’ (LEC, p. 89). My main reason for changing
(B2) is to make clearer that by ‘this fact’ J&P mean the fact that x is square, not the
fact that we believe that x is square. But I have another reason as well: my formula
tion will make it simpler to highlight part of the difference between subjectivism and
expressivism which will emerge in ?II below. I hope I am correct in thinking that I
have not prejudiced any substantive issues by using my formulation.
J&P claim that
b. If we have agreed to use (i) when we believe that we approve of x and think
that circumstances are right for expressing that belief, then we have agreed to
use (i) to report that we approve of x.
This is a paraphrase and particular application of the essentials ofJ&P’s ‘(A2)
Locke’s claim (good): what it would be to use “x is good” to stand for x’s being such
I See, for example, J. Rachels, ‘Subjectivism’, in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethic
(Oxford: Blackwell, ig99i), pp. 432-41.
2 F. Jackson and P. Pettit, ‘A Problem for Expressivism’, Analysis, 58 (1998), pp. 239-5!, and
‘Locke, Expressivism, Conditionals’, Anaysis, 63 (2003), pp. 86-92. I refer to these two articles
as ‘PE’ and ‘LEC’, respectively.
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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND META-ETHICS 589
and such is to agree to use “x is good” when we believe that x is such and such, and
that conditions are right for communicating this fact’ (LEC, p. 89). I use (b), rather
than J&P’s own formulation, because I think it makes the structure of their argu-
ment more clear.
From (a) and (b) it follows that
c. We have agreed to use (I) to report that we approve of x.
Since we have also agreed to use (2) to report that we approve of x, it follows tha
according to expressivism, (I) is equivalent to (2); and so expressivism collapses int
subjectivism.
Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar (henceforth S&S) defend expressivism against
J&P’s argument as presented in PE.3 Their main point is that J&P overlook a
distinction which undermines their argument, the distinction between agreeing to
use sfor c’s obtaining and agreeing merely to use s when c obtains – or more briefly,
between a for-agreement and a when-agreement. For example, (5a) describes a for
agreement; we have agreed to use (5) not only when we believe that x is square, but
also for x’s being square, that is, with the intention of reporting that x is square. S&S
claim that in some cases (i.e., for some s) we agree to use s when we believe that c obtains, but notfor c’s obtaining, that is, not to report that c obtains. In particular, they
claim that according to expressivism, we have agreed to use (i) when we believe that
we approve of x, but not to report our approval of x; so (i) is not equivalent to (2).
I think that the best way to apply S&S’s distinction to my version (based onJ&P’s
later article) ofJ&P’s argument is to invoke a related, or parallel, distinction that
S&S (p. 83) draw between weak and strong expression of a belief. A use of s weakly
expresses the speaker’s belief that c obtains if and only if we have agreed to use s
when we believe that c obtains. A use of s strongly expresses the speaker’s belief tha
c obtains if and only if we have agreed to use s when (i) we believe that c obtains, and
(ii) we intend, by using s, to report the content of that belief(i.e., to report that c
obtains). S&S claim, in effect, that (a) entails only that we use (i) to express weakly
our belief that we approve of x, whereas (b) is true only if it is about strongly express-
ing that belief therefore the argument is unsound, and appears sound only because
it equivocates with respect to the two senses of’express a belief’.
J&P have responded, summing up their disagreement with S&S as follows: ‘The
issue is whether agreeing to use words when you believe such and such and that
conditions are right for communicating this fact is to agree to use your words for
such and such. We follow Locke in saying that it is’ (LEC, p. 88). Thus J&P reject
S&S’s distinction between weak and strong expression of belief: to express a belief is
to report the content of the belief. So (a) entails, in effect, that we use (i) to express
strongly our belief that we approve of x; and so there is no equivocation in the
argument. As for the distinction between when-agreements and for-agreements,J&P
might admit that in some contexts it is important; but in the context of agreeing to
use a sentence to express a belief, the distinction is irrelevant. Thus, given that the
expressivist is committed to (a), S&S’s distinction does not save expressivism from
3 M. Smith and D. Stoljar, ‘Is There a Lockean Argument against Expressivism?’, Analysis,
63 (2003), pp. 76-86.
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590 IRA M. SCHNALL
collapsing into subjectivism. I am inclined to a
conventionally used to express the belief that
intention would be in using s, if it were not to
However, I shall try to show that expressivist
we use (i) to express our belief that we approv
expressivism, we use (i) to express our approv
according to expressivism, the agreement g
believe that we approve of x, but simply to use
agreement is not a for-agreement, and theref
relevant. But my criticism ofJ&P’s argumen
criticism; it is simply that even according to
expressivists are not committed to (a).4
II. BELIEF AND APPROVAL
I shall argue that (a) does not correctly rep
replaced by
a’. We have agreed to use (i) when we approve of x and think that circumstances are
right for expressing that approval.
That is, we should replace ‘we believe that we approve of x’ in (a) by ‘we approve of
x’ (and ‘belief’ by ‘approval’ accordingly). My point is that (a) represents a false
premise inJ&P’s argument; we could solve this problem by substituting (a’) for (a),
but then the resulting argument would be invalid.
In this section, I argue that from J&P’s Lockean perspective, expressivists, in
effect, do accept (a’) rather than (a); and in the next section, I shall argue that
expressivists can consistently accept (a’) and not (a).
I can show that (a’), rather than (a), correctly represents expressivism, by
exploring the following recognizably expressivist account, within a Lockean frame-
work, of how (I) gets its meaning. (I am not endorsing this account, just as
throughout this paper I am not endorsing expressivism. I am merely presenting the
expressivist point of view in such a way as to show that it is not vulnerable to J&P’s
argument.)
Many of us do not realize that ethical judgements are expressions of our attitudes
– for example, that we use (i) to express our approval of x. This is because we tend
to project our approval of x onto x itself, and imagine (with varying degrees of
clarity) that x has an intrinsic normative property, goodness, a property which we
detect by means of a cognitive faculty of moral intuition. We therefore think that
we have agreed to use (1) when we believe, on the basis of moral intuition, that x has
the intrinsic property of goodness. But, the expressivist holds, in fact we have no
such cognitive faculty, and there is no such intrinsic normative property. Still, we
have made a useable agreement; for the terms in which we tend to express it, though
4 Smith and Stoljar (pp. 79 fn. 5, 8i fn. 8) mention something like this as a possible re-
sponse toJackson and Pettit, but do not adopt it or develop it.
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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND META-ETHICS 591
inaccurate as descriptions, nevertheless do refer to actual phenomena. What we are
referring to as ‘believing, on the basis of intuition, that x has the property of good
ness’ is really just approving of x; and what we are referring to as ‘the intrinsi
property of goodness’ is really just the relational (or indexical) property of bein
approved by us, or of evoking, or tending to evoke, our approval. Thus we have
agreed to use (i) when we approve of x, to express our approval, though we may no
have realized that this was what we were doing.
What emerges is that according to expressivism, to say that, for example, Mary
believes that x is good is to say that Mary approves of x, not (as the subjectivist woul
have it) that Mary believes that she approves of x. Thus the average person (or a
intuitionist) might say
Ia. We have agreed to use (i) when we believe that x is good and think that the
circumstances are right for expressing that belief.
A subjectivist would analyse, or rationally reconstruct, (Ia) as
a. We have agreed to use (I) when we believe that we approve of x and think tha
the circumstances are right for expressing that belief.
But an expressivist would rationally reconstruct (Ia) as
a’. We have agreed to use (I) when we approve of x and think that the condition
are right for expressing that approval.
It will perhaps be more evident that (a), inJ&P’s argument, should be replaced by
(a’) if I compare various things that expressivists would say about
s. x is good
with what they (or anyone) would say about
5. x is square.
We can establish a kind of proportion: believing that x is square is to (5) as approving
of x (as opposed to believing that one approves of x) is to (i). For example:
A. If Mary says that x is square, then by saying so, she implies (pragmatically) that
she believes that x is square, though (5) itself does not (semantically) entail
that the speaker or anyone else believes that x is square. Analogously, according to expressivism, if Mary says that x is good, then by saying so, she implies
(pragmatically) that she approves of x; but (i) itself does not (semantically) entail
that the speaker or anyone else approves of x.5
B. IfJohn challenges Mary, saying ‘Do you really believe that x is square?’, then
Mary, if she takes the challenge seriously, will reconsider the reasons for and
against believing that x is square, and then answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, depending on
whether this reconsideration has led her to believe that x is square. If John
challenges Mary, saying ‘Do you really believe that x is good?’, then Mary, if
5 See G.E. Moore, ‘A Reply to My Critics’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G.E.
Moore (La Salle: Open Court, 1942), pp. 535-677, at p. 541.
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592 IRA M. SCHNALL
she takes the challenge seriously, will r
approving of x, and then answer ‘Yes’
reconsideration has led her to approve of
C. If John, in both cases, were a psycholo
Mary get in touch with her thoughts and
respond instead by introspecting and exa
case to determine whether she really beli
to determine whether she really approves o
D. If Mary says that x is square and John
ting that he shares Mary’s belief that x is
x is good, and John responds ‘That is tr
Mary’s approval of x.
These examples illustrate the fact that ac
that x is square corresponds not to her beli
proval of x. So it stands to reason that acco
square in the agreement governing (5) corr
ment governing (I).J&P tell us that the agreem
5a. We have agreed to use (5) when we be
circumstances are right for expressing that
Making the appropriate substitutions, we ge
ing (I), according to expressivism, must be
unsound.
III. ANSWERS TO POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
In response to the above criticism, J&P might press the Lockean point that we do
not express our approval of x if we do not believe that we approve of x; and they
could then claim that truth-conditions are introduced by the fact that believing that
we approve of x is generally involved when we use (i). The basis of this objection
would be Locke’s argument that it makes sense to agree to use s when c obtains only
if we can sometimes know that c obtains, and that adhering to an agreement to use s
when c obtains means using s when we believe that c obtains.
My answer is, first of all, that the point that we do not express our approval of x
unless we believe that we approve of x, though correct, is analogous to the point that
we do not express our belief that x is square unless we believe that we believe that x
is square. But the agreement governing (5) does not mention our believing that we
believe that x is square. So this point does not require that we mention believing that
we approve of x in the agreement governing (I); that is, it does not imply that (a), as
opposed to (a’), belongs inJ&P’s argument.
Secondly, even though we use (i) only when we believe that we approve of x,
it does not follow that our having that belief confers truth-conditions on (i); for it
seems reasonable to say that it is only having a belief which we intend to express by
a use of s that confers truth-conditions on s (see PE, pp. 246-7).
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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND META-ETHICS 593
Thus, for example, the belief which we intend to express by a use of (5) is the
belief that x is square; and that is why a use of (5) is true if and only if that belief i
true – i.e., if and only if x is square. But consider the belief b(r) – that the circum-
stances are right for expressing the belief that x is square, b(r) is generally present
when someone utters (5). But b(r) is irrelevant to the truth-conditions of (5); that is, it
does not matter to the truth-value of a given use of (5) whether the circumstances
were right for expressing the belief that x is square. This is because we do not intend
to express b(r) by using (5). Or consider the belief, or meta-belief, b(b), that we
believe that x is square. Generally when we use (5) to express our belief that x i
square, we believe that we believe that x is square, that is, we also have b(b). But
what we intend to express by a use of (5) is our belief that x is square, not b(b). (We
would express b(b) by reporting the first-order belief, saying ‘I believe that x i
square’.) That is why it is the truth of the belief that x is square that is necessary an
sufficient for the truth of a use of (5); whereas the truth or falsity of b(b) is irrelevan
to the truth or falsity of a use of (5). Similarly, according to expressivism, what w
intend to express by a use of (I) is our approval of x, not our belief that we approve of x. (We would express the latter belief by reporting our approval, saying ‘I
approve of x’.) And that is why the truth or falsity of the belief that we approve of x is
irrelevant to the truth-value of (i), and the fact that we believe that we approve of x
is irrelevant to whether (i) has truth-conditions.
As for the Lockean basis, I would say that Locke’s requirement of cognition of the
relevant conditions c is satisfied in (a’) because our approving of x constitutes ou
awareness, or cognition, of x’s goodness, that is, of x’s evoking our approval. Belief
that we approve of x is cognition not of x’s goodness, but of our thinking x good; and
therefore, as I have said above, it is irrelevant to the question of whether (i) ha
truth-conditions.
J&P present an argument that might be thought (mistakenly) to constitute an
objection to some of what I have said. Expressivists often appeal to the distinction
between expressing and reporting a belief, in an attempt to clarify expressivism and
distinguish it from subjectivism. (I made use of the distinction above, in answering
the objection raised in the present section.)J&P, however, argue that ‘although there
is an important difference between reporting and expressing a belief, it is plausibly a
difference in what is reported. It is not a difference between reporting something
and not reporting at all’ (PE, p. 245). That is, an expression of belief is itself a report
of what is believed, and therefore true or false. Thus, for example, the expression of
the belief that snow is white, though not a report of that belief, nevertheless is a
report – i.e., of snow’s being white – and so is itself true or false. They conclude that
the distinction between reporting and expressing a belief does not serve to support
or clarify the expressivist position that a use of (i) expresses, but does not report, the
speaker’s approval of x, and therefore has no truth-conditions.
J&P are right. Distinguishing between reporting and merely expressing a belief
does not prove that expressions of approval have no truth-conditions; nor does a
sentence expressing a belief provide a model of a sentence without truth-conditions,
after which to pattern expressions of approval. On the contrary, the case of belief
shows that a mere expression of a state of mind can have truth-conditions. But
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594 IRA M. SCHNALL
though we have here neither proof nor mo
counters the generalization that mere expressi
conditions), nevertheless the analogy betwee
reporting vs expressing approval still holds; an
to clarify expressivism. The disanalogy whichJ
distinction between reporting and merely ex
detract from the heuristic value of comparing
approval. The disanalogy is due simply to th
proval themselves. The nature of belief, which
endorsement of a proposition, is such that the
(but not report) a belief is to assert the prop
proposition is true or false. The nature of appr
affective endorsement of a person, action, or st
is such that the way to express linguistically (b
assert a proposition, but rather to exclaim ‘H
good’; neither of these two modes of expression
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that (a) inJ&P’s argument must be replaced by (a’). Th
would render their argument invalid. They might regain validity b
with
b’. If we have agreed to use (I) when we approve of x and think that c
are right for expressing that approval, then we have agreed to us
that we approve of x.
However, unlike (b), (b’) is not plausible. It is plausible to say that to u
with the intention of expressing my belief that c obtains is to report
but I may very well use s in this way without thereby reporting that
obtains. Similarly, it seems that I may very well use a sentence with t
expressing my approval of x without thereby reporting that I approv
fore, using S&S’s terms, we may say that according to expressivism, t
governing (I), given in (a’), is only a when-agreement; whereas accor
tivism, the agreement governing (I), given in (a), is a for-agreement.
I conclude that J&P have not successfully shown that expressivism
subjectivism.6
Bar-Ilan University
6 I would like to thank David Widerker, Jerome I. Gellman and Charlotte K
as two anonymous referees, for help with this paper.
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