University of Business & Technology Artificial Intelligence Essay

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THE BELMONT REPORT
Office of the Secretary
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research
April 18, 1979
AGENCY: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
ACTION: Notice of Report for Public Comment.
SUMMARY: On July 12, 1974, the National Research Act (Pub. L. 93-348) was signed into law, there-by creating the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. One of the
charges to the Commission was to identify the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical
and behavioral research involving human subjects and to develop guidelines which should be followed to assure that
such research is conducted in accordance with those principles. In carrying out the above, the Commission was
directed to consider: (i) the boundaries between biomedical and behavioral research and the accepted and routine
practice of medicine, (ii) the role of assessment of risk-benefit criteria in the determination of the appropriateness of
research involving human subjects, (iii) appropriate guidelines for the selection of human subjects for participation in
such research and (iv) the nature and definition of informed consent in various research settings.
The Belmont Report attempts to summarize the basic ethical principles identified by the Commission in the course of
its deliberations. It is the outgrowth of an intensive four-day period of discussions that were held in February 1976 at
the Smithsonian Institution’s Belmont Conference Center supplemented by the monthly deliberations of the
Commission that were held over a period of nearly four years. It is a statement of basic ethical principles and
guidelines that should assist in resolving the ethical problems that surround the conduct of research with human
subjects. By publishing the Report in the Federal Register, and providing reprints upon request, the Secretary intends
that it may be made readily available to scientists, members of Institutional Review Boards, and Federal employees.
The two-volume Appendix, containing the lengthy reports of experts and specialists who assisted the Commission in
fulfilling this part of its charge, is available as DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0013 and No. (OS) 78-0014, for sale by
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Unlike most other reports of the Commission, the Belmont Report does not make specific recommendations for
administrative action by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Rather, the Commission recommended that
the Belmont Report be adopted in its entirety, as a statement of the Department’s policy. The Department requests
public comment on this recommendation.
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research
Members of the Commission
Kenneth John Ryan, M.D., Chairman, Chief of Staff, Boston Hospital for Women.
Joseph V. Brady, Ph.D., Professor of Behavioral Biology, Johns Hopkins University.
Robert E. Cooke, M.D., President, Medical College of Pennsylvania.
Dorothy I. Height, President, National Council of Negro Women, Inc.
Albert R. Jonsen, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Bioethics, University of California at San Francisco.
Patricia King, J.D., Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Karen Lebacqz, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, Pacific School of Religion.
*** David W. Louisell, J.D., Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
Donald W. Seldin, M.D., Professor and Chairman, Department of Internal Medicine, University of Texas at
Dallas.
*** Eliot Stellar, Ph.D., Provost of the University and Professor of Physiological Psychology, University of
Pennsylvania.
*** Robert H. Turtle, LL.B., Attorney, VomBaur, Coburn, Simmons & Turtle, Washington, D.C.
*** Deceased.
Table of Contents
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for Research Involving Human Subjects
A. Boundaries Between Practice and Research
B. Basic Ethical Principles
1. Respect for Persons
2. Beneficence
3. Justice
C. Applications
1. Informed Consent
2. Assessment of Risk and Benefits
3. Selection of Subjects
Ethical Principles & Guidelines for Research Involving Human Subjects
Scientific research has produced substantial social benefits. It has also posed some troubling ethical
questions. Public attention was drawn to these questions by reported abuses of human subjects in
biomedical experiments, especially during the Second World War. During the Nuremberg War Crime Trials,
the Nuremberg code was drafted as a set of standards for judging physicians and scientists who had
conducted biomedical experiments on concentration camp prisoners. This code became the prototype of
many later codes [1] intended to assure that research involving human subjects would be carried out in an
ethical manner.
The codes consist of rules, some general, others specific, that guide the investigators or the reviewers of
research in their work. Such rules often are inadequate to cover complex situations; at times they come into
conflict, and they are frequently difficult to interpret or apply. Broader ethical principles will provide a basis
on which specific rules may be formulated, criticized and interpreted.
Three principles, or general prescriptive judgments, that are relevant to research involving human subjects
are identified in this statement. Other principles may also be relevant. These three are comprehensive,
however, and are stated at a level of generalization that should assist scientists, subjects, reviewers and
interested citizens to understand the ethical issues inherent in research involving human subjects. These
principles cannot always be applied so as to resolve beyond dispute particular ethical problems. The
objective is to provide an analytical framework that will guide the resolution of ethical problems arising from
research involving human subjects.
This statement consists of a distinction between research and practice, a discussion of the three basic
ethical principles, and remarks about the application of these principles.
Part A: Boundaries Between Practice & Research
A. Boundaries Between Practice and Research
It is important to distinguish between biomedical and behavioral research, on the one hand, and the practice
of accepted therapy on the other, in order to know what activities ought to undergo review for the protection
of human subjects of research. The distinction between research and practice is blurred partly because both
often occur together (as in research designed to evaluate a therapy) and partly because notable departures
from standard practice are often called “experimental” when the terms “experimental” and “research” are not
carefully defined.
For the most part, the term “practice” refers to interventions that are designed solely to enhance the wellbeing of an individual patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose of
medical or behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment or therapy to particular
individuals [2]. By contrast, the term “research’ designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit
conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for
example, in theories, principles, and statements of relationships). Research is usually described in a formal
protocol that sets forth an objective and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective.
When a clinician departs in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the innovation does not, in
and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure is “experimental,” in the sense of new, untested
or different, does not automatically place it in the category of research. Radically new procedures of this
description should, however, be made the object of formal research at an early stage in order to determine
whether they are safe and effective. Thus, it is the responsibility of medical practice committees, for
example, to insist that a major innovation be incorporated into a formal research project [3].
Research and practice may be carried on together when research is designed to evaluate the safety and
efficacy of a therapy. This need not cause any confusion regarding whether or not the activity requires
review; the general rule is that if there is any element of research in an activity, that activity should undergo
review for the protection of human subjects.
Part B: Basic Ethical Principles
B. Basic Ethical Principles
The expression “basic ethical principles” refers to those general judgments that serve as a basic justification
for the many particular ethical prescriptions and evaluations of human actions. Three basic principles,
among those generally accepted in our cultural tradition, are particularly relevant to the ethics of research
involving human subjects: the principles of respect of persons, beneficence and justice.
1. Respect for Persons. — Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical convictions: first,
that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with diminished
autonomy are entitled to protection. The principle of respect for persons thus divides into two separate moral
requirements: the requirement to acknowledge autonomy and the requirement to protect those with
diminished autonomy.
An autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the
direction of such deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons’ considered
opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless they are clearly detrimental to
others. To show lack of respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that person’s considered
judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to act on those considered judgments, or to withhold
information necessary to make a considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so.
However, not every human being is capable of self-determination. The capacity for self-determination
matures during an individual’s life, and some individuals lose this capacity wholly or in part because of
illness, mental disability, or circumstances that severely restrict liberty. Respect for the immature and the
incapacitated may require protecting them as they mature or while they are incapacitated.
Some persons are in need of extensive protection, even to the point of excluding them from activities which
may harm them; other persons require little protection beyond making sure they undertake activities freely
and with awareness of possible adverse consequence. The extent of protection afforded should depend
upon the risk of harm and the likelihood of benefit. The judgment that any individual lacks autonomy should
be periodically reevaluated and will vary in different situations.
In most cases of research involving human subjects, respect for persons demands that subjects enter into
the research voluntarily and with adequate information. In some situations, however, application of the
principle is not obvious. The involvement of prisoners as subjects of research provides an instructive
example. On the one hand, it would seem that the principle of respect for persons requires that prisoners not
be deprived of the opportunity to volunteer for research. On the other hand, under prison conditions they
may be subtly coerced or unduly influenced to engage in research activities for which they would not
otherwise volunteer. Respect for persons would then dictate that prisoners be protected. Whether to allow
prisoners to “volunteer” or to “protect” them presents a dilemma. Respecting persons, in most hard cases, is
often a matter of balancing competing claims urged by the principle of respect itself.
2. Beneficence. — Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions and
protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their well-being. Such treatment falls under
the principle of beneficence. The term “beneficence” is often understood to cover acts of kindness or charity
that go beyond strict obligation. In this document, beneficence is understood in a stronger sense, as an
obligation. Two general rules have been formulated as complementary expressions of beneficent actions in
this sense: (1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms.
The Hippocratic maxim “do no harm” has long been a fundamental principle of medical ethics. Claude
Bernard extended it to the realm of research, saying that one should not injure one person regardless of the
benefits that might come to others. However, even avoiding harm requires learning what is harmful; and, in
the process of obtaining this information, persons may be exposed to risk of harm. Further, the Hippocratic
Oath requires physicians to benefit their patients “according to their best judgment.” Learning what will in
fact benefit may require exposing persons to risk. The problem posed by these imperatives is to decide
when it is justifiable to seek certain benefits despite the risks involved, and when the benefits should be
foregone because of the risks.
The obligations of beneficence affect both individual investigators and society at large, because they extend
both to particular research projects and to the entire enterprise of research. In the case of particular projects,
investigators and members of their institutions are obliged to give forethought to the maximization of benefits
and the reduction of risk that might occur from the research investigation. In the case of scientific research in
general, members of the larger society are obliged to recognize the longer term benefits and risks that may
result from the improvement of knowledge and from the development of novel medical, psychotherapeutic,
and social procedures.
The principle of beneficence often occupies a well-defined justifying role in many areas of research involving
human subjects. An example is found in research involving children. Effective ways of treating childhood
diseases and fostering healthy development are benefits that serve to justify research involving children -even when individual research subjects are not direct beneficiaries. Research also makes it possible to
avoid the harm that may result from the application of previously accepted routine practices that on closer
investigation turn out to be dangerous. But the role of the principle of beneficence is not always so
unambiguous. A difficult ethical problem remains, for example, about research that presents more than
minimal risk without immediate prospect of direct benefit to the children involved. Some have argued that
such research is inadmissible, while others have pointed out that this limit would rule out much research
promising great benefit to children in the future. Here again, as with all hard cases, the different claims
covered by the principle of beneficence may come into conflict and force difficult choices.
3. Justice. — Who ought to receive the benefits of research and bear its burdens? This is a question of
justice, in the sense of “fairness in distribution” or “what is deserved.” An injustice occurs when some benefit
to which a person is entitled is denied without good reason or when some burden is imposed unduly.
Another way of conceiving the principle of justice is that equals ought to be treated equally. However, this
statement requires explication. Who is equal and who is unequal? What considerations justify departure
from equal distribution? Almost all commentators allow that distinctions based on experience, age,
deprivation, competence, merit and position do sometimes constitute criteria justifying differential treatment
for certain purposes. It is necessary, then, to explain in what respects people should be treated equally.
There are several widely accepted formulations of just ways to distribute burdens and benefits. Each
formulation mentions some relevant property on the basis of which burdens and benefits should be
distributed. These formulations are (1) to each person an equal share, (2) to each person according to
individual need, (3) to each person according to individual effort, (4) to each person according to societal
contribution, and (5) to each person according to merit.
Questions of justice have long been associated with social practices such as punishment, taxation and
political representation. Until recently these questions have not generally been associated with scientific
research. However, they are foreshadowed even in the earliest reflections on the ethics of research
involving human subjects. For example, during the 19th and early 20th centuries the burdens of serving as
research subjects fell largely upon poor ward patients, while the benefits of improved medical care flowed
primarily to private patients. Subsequently, the exploitation of unwilling prisoners as research subjects in
Nazi concentration camps was condemned as a particularly flagrant injustice. In this country, in the 1940’s,
the Tuskegee syphilis study used disadvantaged, rural black men to study the untreated course of a disease
that is by no means confined to that population. These subjects were deprived of demonstrably effective
treatment in order not to interrupt the project, long after such treatment became generally available.
Against this historical background, it can be seen how conceptions of justice are relevant to research
involving human subjects. For example, the selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order
to determine whether some classes (e.g., welfare patients, particular racial and ethnic minorities, or persons
confined to institutions) are being systematically selected simply because of their easy availability, their
compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than for reasons directly related to the problem being
studied. Finally, whenever research supported by public funds leads to the development of therapeutic
devices and procedures, justice demands both that these not provide advantages only to those who can
afford them and that such research should not unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among the
beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research.
Part C: Applications
C. Applications
Applications of the general principles to the conduct of research leads to consideration of the following
requirements: informed consent, risk/benefit assessment, and the selection of subjects of research.
1. Informed Consent. — Respect for persons requires that subjects, to the degree that they are
capable, be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them. This opportunity is
provided when adequate standards for informed consent are satisfied.
While the importance of informed consent is unquestioned, controversy prevails over the nature and
possibility of an informed consent. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that the consent process
can be analyzed as containing three elements: information, comprehension and voluntariness.
Information. Most codes of research establish specific items for disclosure intended to assure that subjects
are given sufficient information. These items generally include: the research procedure, their purposes, risks
and anticipated benefits, alternative procedures (where therapy is involved), and a statement offering the
subject the opportunity to ask questions and to withdraw at any time from the research. Additional items
have been proposed, including how subjects are selected, the person responsible for the research, etc.
However, a simple listing of items does not answer the question of what the standard should be for judging
how much and what sort of information should be provided. One standard frequently invoked in medical
practice, namely the information commonly provided by practitioners in the field or in the locale, is
inadequate since research takes place precisely when a common understanding does not exist. Another
standard, currently popular in malpractice law, requires the practitioner to reveal the information that
reasonable persons would wish to know in order to make a decision regarding their care. This, too, seems
insufficient since the research subject, being in essence a volunteer, may wish to know considerably more
about risks gratuitously undertaken than do patients who deliver themselves into the hand of a clinician for
needed care. It may be that a standard of “the reasonable volunteer” should be proposed: the extent and
nature of information should be such that persons, knowing that the procedure is neither necessary for their
care nor perhaps fully understood, can decide whether they wish to participate in the furthering of
knowledge. Even when some direct benefit to them is anticipated, the subjects should understand clearly the
range of risk and the voluntary nature of participation.
A special problem of consent arises where informing subjects of some pertinent aspect of the research is
likely to impair the validity of the research. In many cases, it is sufficient to indicate to subjects that they are
being invited to participate in research of which some features will not be revealed until the research is
concluded. In all cases of research involving incomplete disclosure, such research is justified only if it is
clear that (1) incomplete disclosure is truly necessary to accomplish the goals of the research, (2) there are
no undisclosed risks to subjects that are more than minimal, and (3) there is an adequate plan for debriefing
subjects, when appropriate, and for dissemination of research results to them. Information about risks
should never be withheld for the purpose of eliciting the cooperation of subjects, and truthful answers should
always be given to direct questions about the research. Care should be taken to distinguish cases in which
disclosure would destroy or invalidate the research from cases in which disclosure would simply
inconvenience the investigator.
Comprehension. The manner and context in which information is conveyed is as important as the
information itself. For example, presenting information in a disorganized and rapid fashion, allowing too little
time for consideration or curtailing opportunities for questioning, all may adversely affect a subject’s ability to
make an informed choice.
Because the subject’s ability to understand is a function of intelligence, rationality, maturity and language, it
is necessary to adapt the presentation of the information to the subject’s capacities. Investigators are
responsible for ascertaining that the subject has comprehended the information. While there is always an
obligation to ascertain that the information about risk to subjects is complete and adequately comprehended,
when the risks are more serious, that obligation increases. On occasion, it may be suitable to give some oral
or written tests of comprehension.
Special provision may need to be made when comprehension is severely limited — for example, by
conditions of immaturity or mental disability. Each class of subjects that one might consider as incompetent
(e.g., infants and young children, mentally disable patients, the terminally ill and the comatose) should be
considered on its own terms. Even for these persons, however, respect requires giving them the opportunity
to choose to the extent they are able, whether or not to participate in research. The objections of these
subjects to involvement should be honored, unless the research entails providing them a therapy
unavailable elsewhere. Respect for persons also requires seeking the permission of other parties in order to
protect the subjects from harm. Such persons are thus respected both by acknowledging their own wishes
and by the use of third parties to protect them from harm.
The third parties chosen should be those who are most likely to understand the incompetent subject’s
situation and to act in that person’s best interest. The person authorized to act on behalf of the subject
should be given an opportunity to observe the research as it proceeds in order to be able to withdraw the
subject from the research, if such action appears in the subject’s best interest.
Voluntariness. An agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent only if voluntarily given.
This element of informed consent requires conditions free of coercion and undue influence. Coercion occurs
when an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person to another in order to obtain
compliance. Undue influence, by contrast, occurs through an offer of an excessive, unwarranted,
inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance. Also, inducements that
would ordinarily be acceptable may become undue influences if the subject is especially vulnerable.
Unjustifiable pressures usually occur when persons in positions of authority or commanding influence -especially where possible sanctions are involved — urge a course of action for a subject. A continuum of
such influencing factors exists, however, and it is impossible to state precisely where justifiable persuasion
ends and undue influence begins. But undue influence would include actions such as manipulating a
person’s choice through the controlling influence of a close relative and threatening to withdraw health
services to which an individual would otherwise be entitled.
2. Assessment of Risks and Benefits. — The assessment of risks and benefits requires a
careful arrayal of relevant data, including, in some cases, alternative ways of obtaining the benefits sought in
the research. Thus, the assessment presents both an opportunity and a responsibility to gather systematic
and comprehensive information about proposed research. For the investigator, it is a means to examine
whether the proposed research is properly designed. For a review committee, it is a method for determining
whether the risks that will be presented to subjects are justified. For prospective subjects, the assessment
will assist the determination whether or not to participate.
The Nature and Scope of Risks and Benefits. The requirement that research be justified on the basis of a
favorable risk/benefit assessment bears a close relation to the principle of beneficence, just as the moral
requirement that informed consent be obtained is derived primarily from the principle of respect for persons.
The term “risk” refers to a possibility that harm may occur. However, when expressions such as “small risk”
or “high risk” are used, they usually refer (often ambiguously) both to the chance (probability) of
experiencing a harm and the severity (magnitude) of the envisioned harm.
The term “benefit” is used in the research context to refer to something of positive value related to health or
welfare. Unlike, “risk,” “benefit” is not a term that expresses probabilities. Risk is properly contrasted to
probability of benefits, and benefits are properly contrasted with harms rather than risks of harm.
Accordingly, so-called risk/benefit assessments are concerned with the probabilities and magnitudes of
possible harm and anticipated benefits. Many kinds of possible harms and benefits need to be taken into
account. There are, for example, risks of psychological harm, physical harm, legal harm, social harm and
economic harm and the corresponding benefits. While the most likely types of harms to research subjects
are those of psychological or physical pain or injury, other possible kinds should not be overlooked.
Risks and benefits of research may affect the individual subjects, the families of the individual subjects, and
society at large (or special groups of subjects in society). Previous codes and Federal regulations have
required that risks to subjects be outweighed by the sum of both the anticipated benefit to the subject, if any,
and the anticipated benefit to society in the form of knowledge to be gained from the research. In balancing
these different elements, the risks and benefits affecting the immediate research subject will normally carry
special weight. On the other hand, interests other than those of the subject may on some occasions be
sufficient by themselves to justify the risks involved in the research, so long as the subjects’ rights have been
protected. Beneficence thus requires that we protect against risk of harm to subjects and also that we be
concerned about the loss of the substantial benefits that might be gained from research.
The Systematic Assessment of Risks and Benefits. It is commonly said that benefits and risks must be
“balanced” and shown to be “in a favorable ratio.” The metaphorical character of these terms draws
attention to the difficulty of making precise judgments. Only on rare occasions will quantitative techniques be
available for the scrutiny of research protocols. However, the idea of systematic, nonarbitrary analysis of
risks and benefits should be emulated insofar as possible. This ideal requires those making decisions about
the justifiability of research to be thorough in the accumulation and assessment of information about all
aspects of the research, and to consider alternatives systematically. This procedure renders the assessment
of research more rigorous and precise, while making communication between review board members and
investigators less subject to misinterpretation, misinformation and conflicting judgments. Thus, there should
first be a determination of the validity of the presuppositions of the research; then the nature, probability and
magnitude of risk should be distinguished with as much clarity as possible. The method of ascertaining risks
should be explicit, especially where there is no alternative to the use of such vague categories as small or
slight risk. It should also be determined whether an investigator’s estimates of the probability of harm or
benefits are reasonable, as judged by known facts or other available studies.
Finally, assessment of the justifiability of research should reflect at least the following
considerations: (i)Brutal or inhumane treatment of human subjects is never morally justified. (ii) Risks should
be reduced to those necessary to achieve the research objective. It should be determined whether it is in
fact necessary to use human subjects at all. Risk can perhaps never be entirely eliminated, but it can often
be reduced by careful attention to alternative procedures. (iii) When research involves significant risk of
serious impairment, review committees should be extraordinarily insistent on the justification of the risk
(looking usually to the likelihood of benefit to the subject — or, in some rare cases, to the manifest
voluntariness of the participation). (iv) When vulnerable populations are involved in research, the
appropriateness of involving them should itself be demonstrated. A number of variables go into such
judgments, including the nature and degree of risk, the condition of the particular population involved, and
the nature and level of the anticipated benefits. (v) Relevant risks and benefits must be thoroughly arrayed
in documents and procedures used in the informed consent process.
3. Selection of Subjects. — Just as the principle of respect for persons finds expression in the
requirements for consent, and the principle of beneficence in risk/benefit assessment, the principle of justice
gives rise to moral requirements that there be fair procedures and outcomes in the selection of research
subjects.
Justice is relevant to the selection of subjects of research at two levels: the social and the individual.
Individual justice in the selection of subjects would require that researchers exhibit fairness: thus, they
should not offer potentially beneficial research only to some patients who are in their favor or select only
“undesirable” persons for risky research. Social justice requires that distinction be drawn between classes of
subjects that ought, and ought not, to participate in any particular kind of research, based on the ability of
members of that class to bear burdens and on the appropriateness of placing further burdens on already
burdened persons. Thus, it can be considered a matter of social justice that there is an order of preference
in the selection of classes of subjects (e.g., adults before children) and that some classes of potential
subjects (e.g., the institutionalized mentally infirm or prisoners) may be involved as research subjects, if at
all, only on certain conditions.
Injustice may appear in the selection of subjects, even if individual subjects are selected fairly by
investigators and treated fairly in the course of research. Thus injustice arises from social, racial, sexual and
cultural biases institutionalized in society. Thus, even if individual researchers are treating their research
subjects fairly, and even if IRBs are taking care to assure that subjects are selected fairly within a particular
institution, unjust social patterns may nevertheless appear in the overall distribution of the burdens and
benefits of research. Although individual institutions or investigators may not be able to resolve a problem
that is pervasive in their social setting, they can consider distributive justice in selecting research subjects.
Some populations, especially institutionalized ones, are already burdened in many ways by their infirmities
and environments. When research is proposed that involves risks and does not include a therapeutic
component, other less burdened classes of persons should be called upon first to accept these risks of
research, except where the research is directly related to the specific conditions of the class involved. Also,
even though public funds for research may often flow in the same directions as public funds for health care,
it seems unfair that populations dependent on public health care constitute a pool of preferred research
subjects if more advantaged populations are likely to be the recipients of the benefits.
One special instance of injustice results from the involvement of vulnerable subjects. Certain groups, such
as racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalized may continually
be sought as research subjects, owing to their ready availability in settings where research is conducted.
Given their dependent status and their frequently compromised capacity for free consent, they should be
protected against the danger of being involved in research solely for administrative convenience, or because
they are easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic condition.
[1] Since 1945, various codes for the proper and responsible conduct of human experimentation in medical research have been
adopted by different organizations. The best known of these codes are the Nuremberg Code of 1947, the Helsinki Declaration of
1964 (revised in 1975), and the 1971 Guidelines (codified into Federal Regulations in 1974) issued by the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare Codes for the conduct of social and behavioral research have also been adopted, the best known
being that of the American Psychological Association, published in 1973.
[2] Although practice usually involves interventions designed solely to enhance the well-being of a particular individual, interventions
are sometimes applied to one individual for the enhancement of the well-being of another (e.g., blood donation, skin grafts, organ
transplants) or an intervention may have the dual purpose of enhancing the well-being of a particular individual, and, at the same
time, providing some benefit to others (e.g., vaccination, which protects both the person who is vaccinated and society generally).
The fact that some forms of practice have elements other than immediate benefit to the individual receiving an intervention,
however, should not confuse the general distinction between research and practice. Even when a procedure applied in practice may
benefit some other person, it remains an intervention designed to enhance the well-being of a particular individual or groups of
individuals; thus, it is practice and need not be reviewed as research.
[3] Because the problems related to social experimentation may differ substantially from those of biomedical and behavioral
research, the Commission specifically declines to make any policy determination regarding such research at this time. Rather, the
Commission believes that the problem ought to be addressed by one of its successor bodies.